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Chapter 5
The United States Longevity Insurance Market
Anthony Webb
Although the annuity market in the United States is well developed by
international standards, households rarely voluntarily annuitize any of
their wealth. Most of the longevity insurance enjoyed by American house-
holds is provided by Social Security and defined benefit (DB) pensions.
Social Security pays benefits in the form of a lifetime inflation-protected
annuity, while DB pensions, until recently, typically paid benefits in the
form of a nominal annuity. While these sources of longevity insurance are
declining in importance over time, it is also true that only a very small
proportion of households voluntarily annuitize, and a majority appears to
show a strong preference for converting annuity income into lump sums.
In what follows, we first discuss theoretical calculations of the value of
annuitization. We argue that, once account is taken of pre-annuitized
wealth, longevity risk pooling within marriage, and the risk posed by
uninsured medical costs, the value of annuitization may be less than
sometimes believed. Next, we consider why households appear to be so
reluctant to annuitize. Then, we turn to a discussion of the US annuity
market in more detail, along with product innovations. We conclude by
considering policy options to increase annuitization rates.
Theoretical calculations of the value of annuities
In the absence of annuities, households must trade off the risk of outliving
their wealth against their desire to maximize lifetime consumption. An
annuity is said to be actuarially fair, or to have a money’s worth ratio
(MWR) of one, if the benefit stream discounted by an interest rate and
annual survival probabilities equals the premium paid. An actuarially fair
annuity enables a risk-averse household facing an uncertain life span to
increase lifetime consumption, because it is able to offer a rate of return
in excess of that obtainable on equivalent unannuitized investments. But
in practice, annuities are not actuarially fair; they also involve a loss of
liquidity. This lack of liquidity may be a particular disadvantage in the
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United States, where most households face substantial uncertainty as to the
level of their out-of-pocket health care costs.
A series of papers has attempted to calculate the actuarial unfairness of
annuities around the world, to investigate whether the longevity insurance
they provide is sufficient to outweigh that actuarial unfairness, and to
determine optimal annuitization strategies. The latter calculations require
computationally intensive numerical optimization techniques, and it is
only in the past two or three years that models have begun to incorporate
the level of realism required to support financial planning recommenda-
tions. A first paper to calculate the value of annuities and take account of
the value of the longevity insurance they provide was by Mitchell et al.
(1999). Assuming constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility with plausi-
ble coefficients of risk aversion, they calculated that the value of the
longevity insurance to single individuals with no pre-annuitized wealth
greatly exceeded plausible estimates of the actuarial unfairness of annu-
ities. The value of this longevity insurance was lower, but it was still substan-
tially greater than the estimates of actuarial unfairness, when an assumed
50 percent of wealth was held in pre-annuitized form – for example,
through Social Security and DB pensions. The small size of the US annuity
market was therefore somewhat puzzling. Brown and Poterba (2000)
extended the analysis to married couples, and they found that longevity risk
pooling within marriage substantially reduced the value of annuitization.
A follow-on study by Dushi and Webb (2004) analyzed data from the
Health and Retirement Study, a panel of Americans born between 1931
and 1941, and it found that the average household held much more than
half of its wealth in pre-annuitized form. Again assuming CRRA utility, the
value of annuitizing the small remaining proportion of wealth held in
unannuitized form was now barely sufficient to offset the actuarial unfair-
ness of annuities.1 Those that did annuitize were found to be better off
delaying until their late 70s or early 80s.
These earlier models assume that the household faces no uncertainty
regarding the marginal utility of consumption during retirement, and that
the household has no bequest motive. It is unclear to what extent most
households have a bequest motive, and we believe it is unlikely that the
marginal utility of consumption remains constant during retirement.
Households may prefer greater consumption at younger ages, when they
are better able to enjoy leisure pursuits, and marginal utility may spike in
the event of uninsured medical expenses. Models are only now being
developed (Pang and Warshawsky 2008; Turra and Mitchell 2008; Yogo
2009) that incorporate the risk of incurring uninsured medical expenses.
But these sophisticated models do not as of yet fully incorporate the house,
an asset that plausibly functions as self-insurance against one of the largest
sources of uninsured medical costs, namely the cost of long-term care.
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These earlier models are also sensitive to assumptions made regarding
interest and mortality rates. One alternative would be to use population
mortality tables, but many high-mortality households have little annuitiz-
able wealth. Conversely, households that actually purchase annuities
tend to have much lower than average mortality. The results also depend
upon the assumed interest rate on alternative investments. One alter-
native might be to use the Treasury STRIP interest rate, on the grounds
that a portion of annuity payments is protected by state-level guarantees,
but one might choose the term structure of high-grade corporate bonds
if that is the household’s alternative investment. One must also decide
whether to take the average of the prices charged by all insurance compa-
nies, or to assume that the household shops around, and what assump-
tions to make about the level of management charges on alternative
investments.
From a modeling standpoint, then, it is possible to construct a model in
which many households might choose not to annuitize. Nevertheless, the
almost total absence of voluntary annuitization in practice is still somewhat
puzzling. In 2007, immediate annuity sales excluding structured settle-
ments totaled only $6.8 billion in the United States compared with the
approximately $458 billion of initial Social Security benefit claims in 2008
expected present value.2 This has led to a considerable discussion of both
rational and behavioral explanations for non-annuitization. Brown (2007)
summarizes the principal candidates, and the behavioral reasons appear to
go beyond mere inertia. Evidence from the Health and Retirement Study
suggests that many near-retirement-age respondents state a preference for
receiving a lump sum in place of the annuity from Social Security, even
when the lump sum is favorably priced relative to its actuarial value (Brown
2009). One explanation might be that households are simply incapable of
making the necessary actuarial calculations, but it is also possible that
households frame the decision not as an opportunity to retain valuable
longevity insurance but as a risky gamble that the household will lose if it
dies young. A controlled experiment by Agnew et al. (2008) supports this
view. Individuals who received a presentation that emphasized the benefits
of annuities were significantly more likely to annuitize than those who
received a presentation emphasizing the benefits of unannuitized invest-
ments. Yet, the authors found that the financially literate were actually less
likely to annuitize. Perhaps themore financially sophisticated, or those who
believe they are more financially sophisticated, overestimate their invest-
ment abilities or are less willing to relinquish control over their invest-
ments. It is noteworthy that the one annuity type that has enjoyed
substantial sales is the deferred annuity, a product with a cash surrender
value, even though it provides a lower retirement income than an immedi-
ate annuity.
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The declining role of Social Security and DB pensions
US nationals have traditionally obtained most of their longevity insurance
from Social Security and DB pensions. Both of these sources of retirement
income are declining in relation to preretirement income. Social Security
is a mainly pay-as-you-go social insurance program funded by a payroll
tax. Retired worker benefits can be claimed at any age from 62 to 70, and
they receive an inflation-indexed annuity. The benefits of individuals
claiming before their full retirement age are actuarially reduced, and
those of individuals claiming after their full retirement age are actuarially
increased. The normal retirement age was 65 for individuals born before
1938, but it has been gradually increased to 67 for individuals born after
1959. This increase is equivalent to a 13.3 percent cut in benefits for
individuals who claim benefits at age 65.
Increased female labor force participation has further reduced Social
Security replacement rates. Married women are entitled to claim the great-
er of their own retired worker benefit and a spousal benefit, which, if
claimed at the wife’s full retirement age, equals one half of the husband’s
benefit payable at his full retirement age.3 If the wife is still better off
claiming spousal rather than retired worker benefit, an increase in female
earnings reduces the replacement rate by increasing the denominator (the
household’s earnings), but not the numerator (Social Security benefits).
In the long run, Social Security replacement rates may fall still further.4
Prior to 1984, Social Security benefits were not subject to income tax. From
1984 until 1993, 50 percent of benefits became potentially taxable for
single individuals with incomes of more than $25,000 and married couples
with incomes over $32,000. Beginning in 1994, the maximum taxable
proportion was increased to 85 percent. Importantly, the tax thresholds
were not indexed, so increases in nominal incomes result in an increasing
proportion of retirees facing taxation of benefits.
Historically, DB pensions have been an important source of longevity
insurance in the United States, traditionally providing benefits in the form
of a nominal annuity. But there has been a dramatic increase in the
proportion of DB pension plans that offer a lump-sum option – up from
15 percent in 1995 to 52 percent in 2005 (BLS 1995, 2005). Although DB
pension plans over the past twenty years still predominate in the public
sector, they have largely been displaced in the private sector by 401(k) and
other defined contribution (DC) plans. Figure 5.1 shows the percentage of
private sector workers with pension coverage who have a DB, DC, or both
types of plan.
Brown and Warshawsky (2004) forecast future DB pension plan coverage
and annual benefit payments from a base year of 1999, using the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation Pension Insurance Modeling System. They
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forecast that the number of active plan participants will remain stable at
11million over the twenty-year period, while annual benefits will increase in
inflation-adjusted terms from $94 billion in 1999 to $160 billion in 2019. If a
large proportion of participants exercises the newly acquired right to take
benefits in the form of a lump sum, then benefits could actually fall in real
terms, even without an accelerated decline in DB pension plan coverage.
The extent to which the displacement of DB by DC pension plans reduces
annuitization rates will also depend on the extent to which individuals
voluntarily annuitize their DC plan balances. This is because, in contrast
to other countries (e.g., the United Kingdom, which, prior to April 2006,
required participants in DC plans to annuitize their plan balances by age
75 at the latest), there is no legal requirement for participants to annuitize
at any age. After attaining age 59½, individuals may withdraw their balances
without penalty. Starting in the year that they attain age 70½, they must take
a ‘required minimum withdrawal’ of an amount equal to their plan balance
divided by their remaining life expectancy, as specified in unisex life tables
published by the Internal Revenue Service (2009).
Currently, only 20 percent of plans offer an annuitization option and
only 2 percent of participants exercise it (Reno et al. 2005).5 But Brown
(2001) found that 48 percent of Health and Retirement Study households
stated that they expected to annuitize at least part of their DC account
balances. The first cohort with substantial DC account balances has yet to
reach the point when mortality credits become substantial, and it is possi-
ble – but probably unlikely – that the remaining households will eventually
act in accordance with their stated intentions.
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Figure 5.1 Fraction of workforce covered by pension plan of given type over time.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
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The individual annuity market
The United States is one of the few countries with a significant private
annuity market.6 Poterba (2001) documents the history of annuities in the
United States. Published statistics on the current size and recent growth of
the individual annuity market give a highly misleading picture of the extent
to which households are voluntarily purchasing longevity insurance. This
is because the overwhelming majority of annuity purchases are so-called
deferred, as opposed to immediate, annuities.
Deferred annuities are investment products that give the policyholder the
option to annuitize, but they also permit prior withdrawal of the investment.7
It seems likely that only a small percentage of deferred annuity holders
will eventually exercise the annuitization option. For instance, Brown and
Poterba (2006) report that only about 1 percent of holders currently receive
annuity payments. Renoet al. (2005: 78) report that in 2004, about $10 billion
of deferred annuities was converted into immediate annuities. They typically
give the right to receive a guaranteed minimum payment for life. For exam-
ple, 5 percent of the premium, a right that has provided considerable protec-
tion during the recentmarket downturn. But they lack the essential feature of
immediate annuities that enables them to give an enhanced income return
over similar unannuitized investments, namely the reallocation of wealth
from those who die young to those who live unusually long. In consequence,
they offer a lower guaranteed lifetime income than an immediate annuity,
but they also have a cash surrender value. The amount of that surrender value
will depend on withdrawals taken, investment returns, the guarantees
provided, and the insurance company charges associated with both invest-
ment management and the provision of these guarantees. Trading off lower
income in return for the option to surrender for cash may be attractive to
households with a bequest motive and who place some value on liquidity.
Although voluntary purchases of immediate annuities have increased
in recent years, the increase has been insignificant in relation to the amounts
of longevity insurance provided by Social Security and DB pensions. Table 5.1
reports sales of various annuity types, in billions of dollars, from 1996 onward.
Sales of variable deferred annuities predominate. Total immediate annuity
sales increased from $3.0 billion in 1996 to $6.8 billion in 2007. Variable
immediate annuity sales represented 5 percent of total immediate annuity
sales in 1996. This proportion peaked at 21 percent in 2000 before steadily
dropping over the decade to a low of 1 percent by 2008. Industry representa-
tives have attributed the decline in variable immediate annuity sales to compe-
tition fromdeferred annuity products with income andwithdrawal guarantees.
The taxation of annuities depends on whether they are purchased with
taxed (non-qualified) or tax-deferred (qualified) wealth (such as IRA or
401(k) balances). If they are purchased with tax-deferred wealth, both the
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income and the capital components of the annuity income are subject to
tax. But if they are purchased with taxed wealth, the portion of the annuity
payments that represent the return of that capital is excluded from tax.8
Table 5.2 analyzes immediate annuities between qualified and non-quali-
fied sales. There appears to be no clear trend pattern in the data.
Annuity money’s worth in the United States
James and Song (2002) calculated theMWR for theUnited States and seven
other high- and middle-income countries, and the author found that the
MWRs for the average annuitant exceed 95 percent in almost every country
when discounting at the risk-free Treasury rate. Among annuitants, the
money’s worth for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada,
which operate in the freest markets, was found to be less than that of
Switzerland (120 percent) and Israel (109 percent), which operate in
quasi-mandatory, heavily regulated systems. Gong and Webb (2010) found
that money’s worth figures exceeded 100 percent of the premium paid to
households with annuitant mortality when the income flow was discounted
using either the Treasury STRIP or the term structure of the AA corporate
bond interest rate.9 They were around 100 percent for households with
population-average mortality when the Treasury STRIP interest rate was
used, and came close to 100 percent when the AA corporate bond interest
rate was used. The money’s worths were higher than those calculated by
Mitchell et al. (1999) using 1995 data, perhaps because Gong and Webb
(2010) use institutional prices, though it may also reflect a long-term trend
toward higher money’s worths documented by James and Song (2002).
Annuity product innovation
A number of product innovations in both the immediate and deferred
annuity market have appeared recently. Next, we review these in the
immediate annuity market, though sales have been modest, and to date
most are for traditional nominal annuities.
Variable immediate annuities
Traditional fixed annuities have bond-like investment characteristics, in
that they provide a guaranteed fixed income. In contrast, variable immedi-
ate annuities provide a lifetime income, the amount of which depends on
the performance of an underlying fund. If the return on the underlying
fund exceeds a certain target rate, typically around 4 percent, the annuity
income increases. If the return falls short, the annuity income declines.
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Variable immediate annuities overcome an argument in favor of deferred
annuitization (Milevsky 1998; Milevsky and Young 2007), namely that at
younger ages, households are better off foregoingmortality credits in order
to obtain the benefit of the equity premium. With variable immediate
annuities, households can enjoy both.
There would seem to be a strong case that retired households should
invest at least part of their wealth in variable immediate annuities. Accord-
ing to both economic theory and the recommendations of financial plan-
ners, households should invest mainly in stocks when young and rebalance
in favor of bonds as they age.10 Most life-cycle funds have a significant
equity allocation at the age of retirement. It is unlikely to be optimal to
switch from a mixed equity/bond portfolio the day before the household
annuitizes to zero equity exposure the day after. But as mentioned earlier,
sales of variable immediate annuities remain extremely small.
Medically underwritten annuities
There is a strong relationship between longevity and socioeconomic status
(Attanasio andHoynes 2000). In theory, this ought to provide an incentive for
insurance companies to try to select ‘better’ – that is, high-mortality – risks,
much as providers of life insurance try to screen out high-mortality lives. In
practice, andwith the exception ofmedically underwritten annuities providing
larger payouts to individuals able to demonstrate that they have shorter than
average life expectancy due tohealth-related conditions, the only underwriting
seen in the United States is by sex. In 2004, medically underwritten annuities
comprised only 4 percent of the total market (Drinkwater et al. 2006). These
products have the potential to improve welfare if purchasers of medically
underwritten annuities would otherwise have chosen not to annuitize.
In one state (Montana), insurance companies are refusing to use unisex
pricing. The state of Massachusetts has recently enacted a similar law that
prohibits the use of sex-distinct mortality tables for individual or group
annuities or pure endowment contracts (Currin 2008).
Zip-code underwriting
There are substantial geographic variations in average longevity. Zip-code
or post-code pricing allows insurers to manage longevity risk and reduce
adverse selection by exploiting this relationship. Post-code pricing was
introduced in the UK market in 2007, and several major insurance compa-
nies have announced plans to issue post-code annuities (Hill 2008). Those
living in less affluent neighborhoods will be offered up to a 5 percent
increase in annuity rates (Milner 2008). As yet, no company uses zip-code
pricing in the United States.
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Inflation-protected annuities
An individual purchasing a nominal annuity faces the risk of his income
being eroded by the effects of inflation. At a 2.5 percent inflation rate, a
couple aged 65 faces a 31 percent risk of surviving long enough to see their
real income halved (assuming population mortality for the 1945 cohort).
Households can, of course, purchase increasing nominal annuities, but
these do not protect against unexpected inflation. The overwhelming
majority of purchasers choose a level nominal annuity, possibly because
these offer the highest initial income.
Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS) have existed in the United
States since 1997, but the market for inflation-protected annuities has been
slow to develop. TIAA-CREF has for some time offered a variable immedi-
ate annuity invested in TIPS, but it is not a true inflation-indexed annuity
because changes in real interest rates could affect the value of the invest-
ment and, therefore, the payouts from the annuity. Irish Life was the first
company to offer a true inflation-indexed annuity (Brown et al. 2002).
Although additional companies have entered the market, the size of the
inflation-protected immediate annuity market remains very small. It was
estimated that sales of inflation-indexed immediate annuities were less
than $200 million a year, representing less than 3 percent of total immedi-
ate annuities sold in 2006 (Woolley 2006).
Gong and Webb (2010) calculate that inflation-indexed annuities have
similar money’s worths to those of nominal annuities. They should there-
fore be attractive to households seeking to hedge inflation risk. The lack of
demand to date may reflect a preference for higher real income early in
retirement, or a lack of awareness of the likely effect of inflation on the real
income provided by a level nominal annuity.
Advanced life deferred annuity
Annuities are most effective when used to finance consumption at
advanced old age. Consider a consumer aged 60 who wants to enjoy $1
of consumption at age 100. Assume that the probability of survival to 100 is
1 percent, the real interest is 3 percent, and the insurance company applies
a 100 percent markup on actuarially fair rates. One option for the house-
hold would be to deposit 31 cents in a bank account. With accumulated
interest, that amount would provide the required $1.00 at age 100. But the
consumer would do much better by purchasing an annuity paying out $1 at
age 100, conditional on survival to that age. An insurance company apply-
ing a 100 percent markup would sell that annuity for less than 1 cent.
The advanced life deferred annuity (ALDA) by Milevsky (2005) envisages
an inflation-protected annuity that would be purchased at retirement or
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even earlier. But in contrast to a traditional annuity, income payments start
only at some advanced age, providing insurance against the risk of living
exceptionally long. The deferral period reduces the cost of the longevity
insurance provided by the ALDA just as a large deductible can reduce the
cost of homeowner’s insurance. Although a few insurance companies have
very recently begun to offer ALDA-type products with benefits fixed in
nominal terms, no company has thus far launched the type of inflation-
protected product proposed by Milevsky.
Gong and Webb (2010) compare retirement wealth decumulation stra-
tegies based on an inflation-protected ALDA with three alternatives: buying
of an inflation-protected annuity immediately on retirement, postponing
the purchase of an annuity until some advanced age, or undertaking an
optimal decumulation of unannuitized wealth. They show that the ALDA
approach has three important advantages. First, it enables households to
preserve liquidity at least until the ALDA payments commence, because
the purchase cost is a fraction of the cost of immediate annuities, thus
overcoming a potentially important psychological barrier to annuitization.
A consumer planning to smooth consumption through his retirement
would need to allocate only 15 percent of his age 60 wealth to an ALDA
with payments commencing at age 85, holding the remainder of its wealth
in unannuitized form, to finance consumption from age 60 to 85. Second,
although a risk-averse consumer facing an uncertain life span would prefer
the full longevity insurance provided by an actuarially fair annuity to the
partial longevity insurance provided by an actuarially fair ALDA, the con-
sumer would prefer the ALDA to full annuitization at plausible projected
levels of actuarial unfairness. The intuition is simply that the consumer buys
and gets almost as much longevity insurance. An ALDA also dominates an
optimal decumulation of unannuitized wealth. Third, ALDAs have the
potential to improve and simplify the process of retirement wealth decu-
mulation, using simple rules of thumb that perform almost as well as the
optimal and can be applied to the management of wealth decumulation
over a period ending on the date that the ALDA income commences. In
contrast, widely advocated rules for managing the decumulation of unan-
nuitized wealth over an entire lifetime are highly suboptimal. Nevertheless,
it is understood that ALDA sales have, as yet, been only modest.
Life care annuity
Annuities involve a loss of liquidity, which need not be a serious drawback if
the consumer’s financial needs are known in advance. But US households
are exposed to substantial uninsured medical and long-term care costs,
meaning that a need for liquidity might therefore lead to annuitization.
Warshawsky et al. (2001) propose an annuity structure to address this issue
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by providing increased benefits in the event of the annuitant requiring
long-term care. They argued that a combination product might be less
affected by adverse selection than products sold separately. In fact, though
combined annuity/long-term care products have been in the market for
about eight years, they have achieved only modest sales to date. A recent
study of long-term care insurance professionals has nonetheless suggested
that the market is headed for moderate to strong growth over the next few
years (Matso Lysiak 2007).
Aggregate mortality risk sharing
Anannuity provider faces three kinds ofmortality risk. Thefirst is that it could
obtain a bad draw of mortality outcomes from a given risk pool. The insurer
can largely eliminate this risk by increasing the size of the risk pool. The
second is that the insurer may experience a greater-than-expected level of
adverse selection, for example, if other insurers develop a means of selecting
the ‘better,’ that is, higher mortality risks. The third is that the average
mortality of the whole population may decline more rapidly than expected.
From the perspective of the insurance company, aggregate mortality risk is
far greater than the risk of having a single bad draw from the annuitant pool.
Of course, the opposite is true from the perspective of the annuitant. One
approach might therefore be for the annuitant to share aggregate mortality
riskwith the annuity provider. For the annuitant, the risk of outlivinghis wealth
far exceeds the risk of a small reduction in his annuity income in the event of
average mortality rates decreasing more rapidly than expected. The Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA) actually has such a product on
offer, selling participating annuities through its companion organization
College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF).Here, annuity payments are linked
to participant’s mortality, and historical experience is used as a guide in the
annual adjustment to the mortality participation factor (Piggott et al. 2005).
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have reviewed prospects for the market for longevity
insurance in theUnited States.While theUSannuitymarket is well developed
in terms of product diversity, the evidence suggests that most consumers do
not voluntarily annuitizemuchof their financial wealth at or near retirement.
Accordingly, a question arises as to whether annuities might be further
encouraged or mandated. Mandatory annuitization would reduce annuity
prices if consumers at high risk of early death were required to annuitize and
join the risk pool, though thegainsmay be small empirically, if high-mortality-
risk households have little liquid wealth (Dushi andWebb 2004). Mandating
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would also adversely affect those households that would rationally prefer not
to annuitize, even at the more favorable rates made possible by compulsion;
indeedGong andWebb (2010) calculate that some 16 percent of households
in theUSHealth andRetirement Studywouldbemadeworse off (in expected
utility terms) if annuities were mandated on actuarially fair terms. Further-
more, experience in the United Kingdom suggests that mandatory annuitiza-
tion is quite unpopular.
Encouraging annuitization would be an alternative policy, either by
making them the default option in 401(k) plans or by requiring 401(k)
plans to offer an annuitization option. In fact, this may be compared to the
success of automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans, as mentioned by Brown
and Warshawsky (2004). But circumstances are very different at retirement.
While consumers could favor automatic enrollment as a means to over-
come their own tendency to procrastinate around saving for retirement, it
is far from clear that most consumers understand the importance of
annuities as an appropriate tool for managing wealth decumulation. Also,
there is agreement that defaulting workers into contributing to their em-
ployer’s 401(k) plan does little harm; anyone saving more than desired can
reduce saving subsequently. By contrast, the annuitization decision is usu-
ally irreversible, and there is no consensus on what might represent an
appropriate default. For instance, households might be required to annui-
tize only enough wealth to pay for basic subsistence (as in Singapore; see
Fong et al. 2010). This would, of course, require providers to have access to
information on the retiree’s entire portfolio. Other questions would also
have to be addressed, including the age at which consumers might be
defaulted into annuities, whether the produce should be a level or rising
nominal, inflation-protected, or variable annuity. Similarly, policymakers
would need to evaluate whether spousal consent should be required before
a married individual elected a single life annuity (similar to the consent
required of DB plan participants).
In sum, it seems clear that financial products affording consumers’
protection against longevity risk will become increasingly important in
the United States in the future. Nevertheless, more work must be done
on both the demand and the supply side, to ensure that the industry creates
products that are both effective and suitable for the marketplace.
Notes
1 The assumption regarding the way in which consumption enters the utility
function can substantially affect the results. For example, the value of annuitiza-
tion would be much higher if one were to assume that pre-annuitized wealth met
basic living expenses that did not enter the utility function.
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2 Author’s calculations, assuming populationmortality for the 1944 birth cohort, a
3 percent interest rate, and the number of new benefit claims reported in SSA
(2009).
3 Married men can also claim a spousal benefit if their earnings are sufficiently
large in relation to those of their wives.
4 The Social Security Trustees project that in the absence of tax increases or
benefit cuts, the Social Security Trust Fund will be exhausted by 2042, at which
point benefits, including benefits in payment, would be cut by approximately 30
percent.
5 The remaining 80 percent can still access the annuity market by rolling over their
401(k) balance into an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) offering an annuity
option.
6 Other countries are Canada, Chile, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom (Mackenzie 2006: 24).
7 For a review, see Brown and Poterba (2006). Many deferred annuities appear to
have high investment management, insurance, and surrender charges.
8 For further information, see http://www.irs.gov/publications/p939/ar02.
html#d0e819
9 The authors used institutional rates supplied by Hueler Associates that are
slightly more favorable than retail rates. Population mortality was obtained
from Social Security cohort life tables, and annuitant mortality was projected
using Projection Scale AA.
10 Financial planners often argue that younger households should hold a greater
proportion of their financial assets in stocks because stocks are relatively less risky
over long horizons, a questionable claim. A more convincing justification (Ja-
gannathan and Kocherlakota 1996) is that a large proportion of the wealth of
younger households is held in relatively low-risk human capital.
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